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Abstract
This study questions efficiency-driven institutions in the financial sector during and after the
financial crisis of 2008. Frustration about inadequately working financial institutions encouraged
citizens to employ self-help initiatives reflected in the revival of, for example, financial coopera-
tives, sharing economies and community currencies. Some of these grassroots initiatives, such as
financial self-help groups, are imported by migrants and refugees. Compared to the formal bank-
ing system, financial self-help groups claim effectivity and a human face instead of efficiency in
operation and management. We look at financial self-help groups among Ethiopians and
Ghanaians living in the Netherlands, placing these financial self-help groups within the contem-
porary financial landscape. Here, diversity instead of a monoculture of banking institutions shows
us a way to a more sustainable financial system. Moreover, this article shows that a combination
of different kinds of resilience creates possibilities for analysing the dynamics of a kaleidoscope of
financial arrangements and institutions.
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Contemporary banking systems have faced many crises around the globe. The World Bank
can trace more than 96 banking crises and 176 monetary crises since the early 1970s, when
US President Nixon introduced the floating exchange regime (Caprio and Klingebile, in
Lietaer et al., 2010: 3). Due to globalisation of the financial sector, such crises easily cross
national borders (Sassen, 2014; Wojcik, 2011). For example, the 2008 financial crisis, which
started in the US, also had a detrimental impact on emerging cities in the Global South
(Ferguson et al., 2014; Sassen, 2014). However, Christophers et al. (2017: 22) show that the
US and European financial sectors were often successful in escaping governmental and
regulatory reform agendas. Banks could increase ‘capital ratios by raising more equity,
they [could] also do so simply by reducing lending and investments – and thus assets
accrued – in areas deemed risky’.
To cope with financial crises, governments focus mainly on increasing the efficiency of
financial institutions. By doing so, however, more banks become increasingly similar to
those that caused the crisis. In this respect, Lietaer et al. (2009: 4) report:
[W]henever a bank that is too big to fail is in real trouble, the recipe has been the same since
the 1930s: the taxpayers end up footing the bill to bail out the banks, so that they can start all
over again.
A similar approach was used during the 2008 financial crisis, but this has not led to a more
sustainable solution. The emphasis on improving the operating efficiency of banking insti-
tutions in crisis has merely led to the additional formation of similar kinds of financial
institutions within the financial landscape. Banking institutions have tended to continue
their business in more or less similar ways as before the crisis, thereby creating a path to
the next financial crisis (e.g. Lietaer et al., 2009; Luyendijk, 2016; Tett, 2009). Christophers
et al. (2017: 12) report that the cause of the 2008 financial crisis should not be seen as a result
of individual opportunism combined with ‘unlucky or accidental outcomes in an otherwise
stable institutional setting, but of systemic or quasi-systemic processes that are . . . caught up
in times and spaces that are always but never only political-economic’.
For the past two decades, this contemporary financial landscape has been questioned by a
theoretical debate among mostly economists and geographers regarding diverse or alterna-
tive economies/financing that generally challenge the dominance of capitalism (Gritzas and
Kavoulakos, 2016; Jonas 2010, 2013; Lee, 2013; North, 2013; Leyshon et al., 2004;
GibsonGraham, 1996, 2008, Gibson-Graham et al., 2013). Their main criticism is that,
due to the dominance of contemporary financial and banking institutions in the
efficiency-driven capitalistic system, the emerging or existing variety of other forms has
been mostly ignored and has, therefore, remained invisible. To show that capitalist relations
are only a small portion of financial life, Gibson-Graham (2014: S149) introduced the ‘ice-
berg metaphor’. This implies that only a small part of the iceberg – the capitalistic system –
can be seen above the surface, while the larger part, the other financial arrangements, are
hidden from view. In this invisible part of the Global North, one can trace grassroots
initiatives such as financial cooperatives, sharing economies, community currencies, and
financial self-help groups (SHGs) that are being nourished by the experiences of non-
Western migrants and refugees, especially within the African diaspora (see e.g. Ardener
and Burman, 1995; Hossein, 2015, 2017).
This study demonstrates that financial SHGs within the African diaspora can play an
important role in the resilience of the financial landscape of the Netherlands. The African
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diaspora in the Netherlands consists of a variety of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.
Some came directly from their own countries and others arrived indirectly via Suriname,
the Dutch Antilles, and Cape Verde. These people largely self-identify in terms of their
specific origins, such as Surinamers, Antilleans, Somalians, Cape Verdeans, Ghanaians,
Ethiopians, and Kenyans. However, increasingly the receiving society has forced them ‘to
recognise their commonality as ‘black’ or as ‘African’ ’ (Blakely, 2005: 593).
We focus on a specific kind of financial SHG, the rotating savings and credit association
(ROSCA) in the Netherlands. For centuries, ROSCAs have been part of financial land-
scapes in the Global South, with ‘long-standing traditions of pooling resources that have
historically helped excluded groups engage in alternative financial services’ (Hossein, 2017:
30). Migrants in Western society have brought these practices with them from their coun-
tries of origin. In North America, for instance, ROSCAs continue to play a crucial role in
the contemporary Black social economy (Hossein, 2018; Nembhard, 2014). In a ROSCA,
people regularly deposit money into a common fund, which is then allocated entirely or
partially to each participant in turn (see e.g. Ardener, 1964; Ardener and Burman, 1995;
B€ahre and Smets, 1999; Bijnaar, 2002; Bouman, 1978, 1995; Hossein, 2015, 2017; Smets,
1996, 1998, 2000). We illustrate the workings of a ROSCA with the following example based
on our fieldwork: 12 people each save EUR 100 monthly, which is deposited into a common
fund. The first month, the total amount of EUR 1200 is given to one of the members. The
next month, the pot is handed over to another person. This continues until every participant
has received the lump sum once. The rotation order may be decided by drawing lots or by
auction, seniority, voting, consensus, or the organiser’s choice. Once all participants have
received the fund, the group will be either dissolved or continued for another cycle (Smets,
1998).
To obtain more insight into the role of financial SHGs and the resilience of the contem-
porary financial landscape in the Netherlands, we look at two specific cases within
the African diaspora: the ROSCAs of Ethiopian and Ghanaian migrants. We begin by
exploring the concept of resilience in the contemporary financial landscape. Then, we
take a closer look at the operation of ROSCAs among Ethiopian and Ghanaian migrants
in the Netherlands, followed by a discussion and comparison of both ROSCA types. We
discuss how these financial SHGs can and do contribute to the ecosystem of the financial
landscape.
Resilience and the contemporary financial landscape
In late modernity, solid structures – such as many welfare institutions, traditional loyalties,
customary rights and obligations – have melted, or are expected to melt away. This has also
led to a decline in ‘traditional’ organisations and their functions in society (Bauman, 2000).
These organisations, according to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002), are ‘zombie institu-
tions’ that have lost, or will lose their original function. Without these solid structures that
once enabled collective action, the individual is left alone with his or her tasks, duties,
responsibilities and coping mechanisms. Against the background of these declining tradi-
tional organisations, grassroots initiatives that address new societal issues have emerged
(Bauman, 2000), enriching the contemporary financial landscape. Below, we first discuss the
concept of resilience and how Lietaer et al. (2019) applied this concept to the financial
landscape that consists of a kaleidoscope of financial institutions and arrangements.
Second, we use social resilience as a conceptual framework to analyze issues such as the
meaning/function/presence of a ROSCA as a community of practice. This will offer insight
into the adaptability present within the financial landscape.
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Different views of resilience
The development of contemporary society is unpredictable, which implies that everything
should be resilient. In practice, resilience is a vague concept that is also criticized for its
neoliberal austerity and structural power mechanisms (Rast et al., 2019). Despite criticisms,
we aim at providing insight in the concept of resilience that is characterized by different
meanings and discourses. According to a conservative view, resilience is the ability and
flexibility to change that refers to ‘the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and
reorganise while undergoing change so as to retain essentially the same function, structure,
identity, and feedbacks’ (Walker et al., 2004, in Lietaer et al., 2009). Siemiatycki et al. (2016)
discuss two different views of resilience: the engineering approach and the adaptive
approach. First, the engineering approach sees resilience as a mechanism of bouncing
back to a single original state of equilibrium, like what happens with a stretched string
that returns to its original form after it is released. When this view is applied in neoclassical
economics, we see that after an interruption, a new path will be found towards the original
situation or even a new economic equilibrium. This view does not take into account histor-
ical developments. Second, the adaptive approach assumes another type of recovery and is
popular among heterodox economists but also planners, urbanists and geographers. This
approach assumes an ability to change by adapting ‘to what capitalism historically throws
up’ (p. 186). In contrast to the engineering approach, is done through the creation of a new
situation in which all elements of a system seek a new balance. By looking into resilient
regional systems it appears that the adaptive approach, instead of bouncing back, bounce
forward. To illustrate this, Siemiatycki et al. (2016) look into Vancouver’s video game
industry and the broader economy. In the 1980s, the video game industry entered
Vancouver, but there was almost no link between the video game industry and the earlier
urban economy. Shocks and disturbances come from inside and outside the regional ori-
ented system. Here is an internal/external dualistic geography, which needs ‘a history of
innovation, a past capacity to learn along with apt educational institutions, a spirit of
entrepreneurship, an appropriate infrastructure, available investors and investment capital,
and thick interlacing networks of formal and informal civic institutions’ (Siemiatycki et al.,
2016: 187). The approaches described above refer to the economic sector, but they are also
applicable to the financial landscape, as we will show below.
The financial landscape as an ecosystem
We speak of the financial landscape as an ecosystem in which all financial institutions and
arrangements have to find a balance. Lietaer et al. (2010) propose using an ecosystem
approach that looks for balance between efficiency and resilience, which reflects the capa-
bility to adjust to changing circumstances. In their literature study, Lietaer et al. (2009: 11)
define efficiency as the integrity and capacity of a network to work in a well-organised and
efficient way over a period of time. Resilience is a network of fallback positions and actions
that cause disturbances that trigger enduring developments. It measures the system’s ability
to recover from disturbances.
Two other factors affecting the financial landscape are diversity and interconnectivity.
Diversity refers to the existence of different types of agents acting as ‘nodes’ in the network,
and interconnectivity looks into pathways between agents. Diversity and interconnectivity
play a central role related to efficiency and resilience, but in a different way. In general, the
resilience of a system is larger once it has more diversity and connections, implying that
these create a safety net that can be used in times of change or trouble. However,
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emphasising efficiency through streamlining tends to lead to declining diversity and connec-
tivity (Lietaer et al., 2009). In practice, nature does not select for maximum efficiency but for
an optimal balance between the poles of efficiency and resilience. Because both are indis-
pensable for long-term sustainability, the healthiest economic systems are those that main-
tain an optimal balance between the two. Conversely, an excess of either one leads to system
instability. Too much efficiency leads to brittleness, and too much resilience leads to stag-
nation in the development of the system; the former is caused by too little diversity and
connectivity, the latter by too much (Lietaer et al., 2009). Sustainable financial systems,
therefore, have an optimum balance, which can be found in the window of viability (see
Figure 1).
An ecosystem that requires change needs incentives to find a balance between the oppos-
ing poles of efficiency and resilience. As with natural ecosystems, financial and monetary
systems around the globe have to face constant improvements in system efficiency. This can
be seen especially among mainstream banks in the global financial system. However, too
much efficiency and the associated lack of diversity lead to bank crashes and financial crises,
while an emphasis on resilience comes with a lack of coherence and purpose to growth,
eventually leading towards a system collapse (see Figure 2). Such efficiency discourse
Figure 1. Window of viability.
Source: Based on Lietaer et al. (2009).
Figure 2. Impact of an efficiency-driven finance sector.
Source: Based on Lietaer et al. (2009).
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highlights motivations within the financial sector that stimulate too much ‘individual self-
interest, competition, . . . freedom, innovative entrepreneurship, exploitation, and the pur-
suit of private gain’ (Gibson-Graham, 2014: S151). Under such circumstances the window of
viability will not be reached.
A systemic solution to a banking or financial crisis would be to increase the resilience of
the financial landscape by incorporating different kinds of financial institutions, arrange-
ments, channels and exchanges. This diversity is reflected in the range of arrows on the left
side of Figure 3. In other words, by enlarging the diversity of the financial landscape, the
window of liability can be reached. However, Siemiatycki et al. (2016: 197) remark that the
process of capitalism is characterised by a restless system and a financial landscape that is
never in equilibrium. The system is prone to shocks, meaning that all organisations have to
face adaptation: that is, the window of viability will be hardly ever reached, if at all.
To rebalance the financial system, a diversified financial landscape is needed that includes
a kaleidoscope of financial arrangements and institutions, such as private and public bank-
ing institutions, housing finance institutions and cooperative banks based on the Raiffeisen
principles (Seibel, 2010). One example is community currencies, which can only be invested
and exchanged between local businesses and customers within a certain geographic com-
munity. Community currencies are based on the rationale that money is a social construct
that builds more sustainable incentives than conventional finance linked with solid institu-
tions (Seyfang and Longhurst, 2013). In crowdfunding initiatives, small amounts of money
are collected online among a large group of interested investors. Such investments are based
not only on profit-making but also on the investment’s impact for the larger society or on
what investors receive in return, such as CDs or theatre vouchers (Toxopeus and Toxopeus,
2012). Financial service providers such as moneylenders, pawnbrokers and financial SHGs
are even more informal. In the Global South, financial SHGs often serve as financial safety
nets and to enable income-generating activities, improve personal financial management,
empower members by increasing their social status, create new networks and stimulate
entrepreneurial activities (Fleischer-Proa~no et al., 2011; Gash and Odell, 2013; Smets,
2019). It is impossible for us to describe here all the types of financial SHGs that have
emerged as alternative to the banking institutions. The emergence of such alternatives also
illustrates that people have begun to look for ways to keep financial affairs in their own
hands (Buttle, 2008; Dubois and Lasida, 2010). By being aware of this diversity, the financial
system moves from being dominated by solely efficiency-driven institutions to including a
larger diversity, and thus, in the end, reaching the window of liability.
Figure 3. Impact of a more diverse financial landscape.
Source: Based on Lietaer et al. (2009).
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So far, today’s financial ecosystem has found its own balance within the window of
viability. However, in an economic and financial system in which people are involved,
power relations play an important role. When linked to specific types of financial institu-
tions and arrangements, they can destabilise the financial system. Because of these power
relations within the financial and banking institutions, the window of viability cannot be
reached within the contemporary neoliberalisation of financial markets due to competition
within contemporary neoliberalization of financial markets (see e.g. Luyendijk, 2016). Apart
from this macro focus, it is also important to look into the community level where power
relations exist within social relations ad the the organizational structure of financial SHGs.
The adaptability of social relations can be captured in the concept of social resilience, which
Hall and Lamont (2013) view as the capability of people in a group or organization to
sustain and improve their well-being. For this article, we focus on social resilience within
communities of practice.
Financial SHGs as communities of practice
Besides understanding resilience in a financial ecosystem dominated by similar organiza-
tions, it, is also important to look into the role of financial SHGs. Communities bring the
responsibility back to the collective instead of to the solid institutions. One type of com-
munity that can play an important role in strengthening resilience is the community of
practice. In the window of viability members of a community of practice join hands to
initiate a shared understanding of the meaning of their joint endeavour and the ability to
adapt to changes. Here, participants are held responsible for the collective enterprise. By
working together, the community members become mutually engaged and develop related
norms and a set of collective resources (Wenger, 2000: 229). All transactions take place in
local spaces or networks in which individuals and organisations question whether the inter-
dependent relations are democratic. Consequently, such communities deal with hot money
instead of cold money (Wright, 2000). Cold money comes from external agencies with which
participants in specific financial arrangements do not have mutually responsible relation-
ships. They, therefore, feel less committed to the financial arrangement. Here, participants’
feelings of responsibility for repaying a loan diminish once the money is considered not
theirs, but the agency’s. They do not feel responsible for repaying a loan nor do they
consider it an obligation. An alternative to cold money is hot money, which is provided
with a face-to-face approach wherein personal interaction is practised and money is con-
trolled by those who feel responsible for it. Hot money is treated as being one’s own. To
understand a community of practise that deals with hot money, such as a ROSCA, it is also
important to look into its form of leadership and its trust relations.
In the operation of ROSCAs, finance can be allocated to either a democratic or author-
itarian way. Participants in a democratic ROSCA allocate the fund, in whole or in part,
during meetings with face-to-face contact and shared understanding, while in an authori-
tarian ROSCA, the organiser makes allocation decisions. The face-to-face contact in an
authoritarian ROSCA is limited to members’ individual relationships with the organiser,
who has much more influence on the group’s success than does an organiser of a democratic
ROSCA. In a democratic ROSCA, the collective is responsible for coping with default risk
because they know each other personally, whereas in an authoritarian ROSCA, this is more
the responsibility of the organiser(s) (Smets, 1992).
To enable resilience in a community of practice, trust relations in democratic and author-
itarian ROSCAs are of great importance. But what is trust exactly? Misztal (1996: 12) argues
that ‘trust is a (. . .) recurrent feature of social relationships’ that enables the functioning of
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social networks as well as economic transactions. Here, we will refer to three types of trust:
individual trust, social trust and earned trust. According to Svendsen (2014), individual trust
is trust in a person one already knows. In the case of financial SHGs, this means that one
already knows another member very well from other settings, for instance being a family
member, a close friend or a colleague. Another form of trust is social trust:
[This kind of trust] is expanded to include people about whom the trusting party has no direct
information. Thus, social trust reflects a positive perception of the generalized other. It is a belief
that the people one may interact with will behave decently. A person’s level of trust thus reflects
a standard estimate of an unknown other’s trustworthiness. (Svendsen, 2014: 15)
The third type of trust is when people do not (yet) trust others, especially when it comes to
handling money together. In such cases, trust has to be earned. As trustworthy relationships
in traditional organizations have melted down in times of late modernity, trust is not a
commodity that can be imported from a prior set of relationships, but individuals have to
built a reputation of being trustworthy.
Also in a ROSCA, trust ‘is something that has to be made and remade and thereby reinforced
over and over again. People stay in ROSCAs because they observe, round by round, that
everyone is obeying the rules. Trust is more of a verb than a noun.’ (Rutherford, 2009: 51)
Such a reputation can also be described as earned trust (Knorringa, 1999: 70). which is
based on reciprocal relations like those that happen in ROSCAs. ‘Earned trust’ thus refers
to trust that one can obtain by showing positively valued behaviour and transactions, which
are expected to continue in the future (Rutherford, 2009).
When we see ROSCAs as a community of practice, trustful relationships in a democratic
organization and leadership trusted by participants in an authoritarian ROSCA are impor-
tant premises for successful operations. Based on these conditions, a process of change can
take place in the communities. Hall and Lamont (2013) see this process of change as social
resilience. To enable change, people [in these communities] ‘assemble a variety of tools,
including collective resources and new images of themselves’ (ibid.: 14). One way of how
this change in and around communities take place is through the concepts of adaptability
and transformability. The adaptability to change includes learning combining experience
and knowledge, and modifying and developing an existing system. Transformability refers
to the ability of establishing a new system once the previous system stops functioning well
(Folke et al., 2010).
Resilience in the financial landscape focuses mainly on physical or area resilience and that
social resilience is underestimated. However, in the section on ROSCAs among Ethiopian
and Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands and the section on ROSCAs and social resilience
reconsidered, we show why social resilience is important for obtaining a sustainable
ecosystem.
Research methodology
This study used an ethnographic research approach to engage with Ghanaian and Ethiopian
diaspora communities living in the Netherlands. The qualitative findings were part of a
larger study carried out among 16 ethnic minorities (Kappers and Lehmann, 2011). In
the Dutch context, money is generally perceived as a sensible subject to talk about.
However, members of Ghanaian and Ethiopian ROSCAs were often very reluctant to
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speak about their participation. They regarded this activity as a very private affair, one
perceived as exotic and redundant by Dutch society. Therefore, the investigation of an
informal financial arrangement that exists outside the regulatory framework of banks had
to be approached very carefully. Access to ROSCA participants was gained through com-
munity gatekeepers, such as community leaders and migrant organisations, who could act as
a bridge between community members and outsiders. We contacted most of the migrant
organisations at random through extensive desk research. Some of the community leaders
and other individuals with Ghanaian and Ethiopian backgrounds were approached through
personal contacts or those of other colleagues and acquaintances.
To start the conversation on ROSCAs, we drew on ‘intra- and interpersonal resources
and strategies that we all tend to develop in dealing with everyday life’ (Hammersley and
Atkinson, 1995: 41). For this reason, we also took part in some of their local associations’
activities (especially Ethiopians) or visited their churches (especially Ghanaians). To, find
respondents for an interview we started the conversation with a basic question about how
they help each other within their community. Once a certain level of trust was established,
enthusiastic questions about ROSCAs were not perceived as disturbing anymore. The inter-
viewees appreciated our interest at that point and were willing to share their stories. With
both Ghanaians and Ethiopians, we held many informal talks and used snowball sampling
to enlarge our research population (Bloch, 2004: 176). As a result, we conducted 12 semi-
structured interviews (varying between 30 and 60 minutes) with Ethiopians living in the
Netherlands (five women and seven men, ages 25–65 years) and 9 semi-structured interviews
(varying also between 30 and 60 minutes) with Ghanaians (four women and five men, ages
30–55 years). The socio-economic position of the interviewees was very diverse, ranging
from social welfare recipients to a bank employee.
ROSCAs among Ethiopian and Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands
Using the Ethiopian iqqub and the Ghanaian susu (Kappers and Lehmann, 2011) in this
section of case studies, we explain how ROSCAs operate as a community of practice. For
each case, we describe the migration backgrounds of the community before illustrating how
their ROSCAs – iqqubs or susus – operate in the Netherlands.
The Ethiopian case
In the Netherlands, Ethiopian migrants participate in iqqubs. The first Ethiopian refugees
arrived in 1976. From 1995 to 2003, 57% of Ethiopian migrants arrived as asylum seekers,
while 20% came to study, many with scholarships to the Institute of Social Studies in The
Hague or to Wageningen Agricultural University. The remainder came to the Netherlands
mainly to reunite with family (Van Heelsum and Hessels, 2006). Many Ethiopian migrants
had obtained secondary or university educations in Ethiopia, or they tried to pursue their
education in the Netherlands, which was not always possible (Van Heelsum and Hessels,
2006: 63). The case of Tsehai demonstrates how and why she participates in an iqqub in the
Netherlands.
Tsehai arrived in the Netherlands in 1981 as a 20-year-old refugee. She has a university degree, is
married with children and works as a social worker in Amsterdam.
For about six years, Tsehai has participated in an iqqub with 19 other members. Most members
pay a monthly fee of EUR200, but some share this amount. The iqqub’s cycle is 1 1=2 years. The
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woman who manages the iqqub collects all contributions and allocates lump sums to the par-
ticipants by turn. If someone needs the fund urgently, the coordinator tries to swap turns.
In this ROSCA, participants do not meet once the financial transactions take place. They pay the
coordinator in person during the first week of eachmonth, though someonewho lives too far away
might pay by bank transfer. If a participant cannot pay in time, he or she contacts the coordinator.
To join the iqqub, a person’s reputation in the Ethiopian community is of great importance.
Trustworthy participants can introduce and guarantee the payment behaviour of a new member.
The lump sum received might be spent on, for example, a holiday in Ethiopia. Flights to
Ethiopia are expensive (about EUR800), especially if one wants to take family members
along. Moreover, relatives and friends in Ethiopia expect gifts. Tsehai knows most of the
participants. The iqqub participants invite each other for birthday parties, weddings and
other social celebrations. This enables the maintenance of social contacts even though they
do not meet regularly for the iqqub.
Two types of iqqubs were identified: iqqubs that continue after a cycle has finished and those
that terminate at the end of one cycle. Tsehai participates in a continuing iqqub based on an
authoritarian form of leadership: the coordinator controls the contributions, can decide
whether members can swap turns and has the legitimization to go after members who are
unwilling to pay. Although the Ethiopian participants seem to have good access to basic
banking services such as bank accounts and saving facilities, they still participate in iqqubs.
This participation provides them with cheap and easy access to finance or an extra moti-
vation to save a lump sum of money. Tsehai prefers to receive the total amount at the
beginning: ‘I take the money at the beginning. I consider it a cheap loan’. In contrast to her
fellow group members, she wants to receive the total amount towards the end of the
ROSCA cycle. For these participants, saving may be more attractive than easy access to
credit. In addition, participants who engage in social contact with other participants during
non-ROSCA activities may develop reciprocal helping relations. Tsehai is afraid of losing
these contacts and the related mutual help if she were to leave the ROSCA.
In the other type of Ethiopian ROSCA, participants come together for only one round to
help others during an emergency. For example, Abebech (26) participated for one year in an
iqqub based on individual trust with friends and relatives from Rotterdam and Amsterdam.
She participated to help one of her friends who urgently needed a large sum. Instead of
having to lose face by admitting to a financial problem, asking for a loan and becoming
indebted, this friend offered friends and relatives the opportunity to participate in an iqqub.
Reality shows that, for many, peers are often more accessible than a banking institution.
Interestingly, the initiator did not automatically become the coordinator of the iqqub but
left it to the oldest member of the group, whom the others trusted the most. After one year,
participants had helped their friend and did not start a new cycle, because it took too much
effort to meet. Abebech summarised, ‘If you do not need it, you don’t do it’. It was impor-
tant for Abebech to participate because she could help her friend, maintain reciprocal
relations and achieve a high level of earned trust: ‘We had social contacts that way. Not
everyone has family in the Netherlands and this will keep you together.’
Some interviewees reported that they had previously joined an iqqub in the Netherlands,
but now refrain from participation, while others have never participated before, or they
reject the idea of participating in an iqqub in the Netherlands. One reason for not partic-
ipating is that they have difficulty trusting each other. They have to first build a reputation
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of trust by maintaining reciprocal relations with other (potential) ROSCA participants.
Yemisrach (50), a board member of an Ethiopian migrant association, reports:
We are very diverse. We have 80 languages, many colours, local things . . . And yes, how well do
we know each other here in the Netherlands? Someone comes from the east, someone from the
north and someone from the south.
He adds that political refugees might have experienced much cruelty back in Ethiopia. Even
though they are safe now, they have to rebuild trust in others. Moreover, interviewees
stressed that Ethiopians consider talking about money to be a very sensitive issue. In con-
trast to Tsehai, who openly confirmed that she needs the iqqub for maintaining her savings
behaviour, others avoided talking about their financial affairs. For example, Helina, a
middle-aged woman actively involved in the Ethiopian community in the Netherlands,
argued firmly, ‘Money is something very personal to me and I talk to nobody about it!’
Hagos, an employed man of 30, participated in an iqqub as a student to finance his school-
books, but now he prefers to save individually using self-discipline. He said this had to do
with general shyness and avoiding embarrassment and added, ‘Our culture handles money
with difficulty’.
The Ghanaian case
Ghanaians participate in susus in their country of origin and in the new host society. During
the oil crisis in the 1970s and the severe drought in the 1990s, Ghanaians migrated to the
Netherlands for economic purposes. Many of these migrants have one or two jobs. Almost
60% of those employed work in the cleaning business, hotels, restaurants and cafes.
However, the second generation has higher levels of education and earns higher incomes
(Kraan, 2001). The case of Peter shows how one Ghanaian migrant makes use of a susu in
the Netherlands.
In the early 1990s, Peter arrived in the Netherlands at the age of 10. Today, he is married and
has children. At the time of the interview, he had just finished a degree program in strategic
management and was employed at a bank. Peter is participating in a susu with 10 to 15 members
living in and around The Hague. Members pay EYR500 monthly. Couples can share this
amount. The group members do not meet, and they hardly know each other personally,
which means the coordinator has to provide good management. At the end of each month,
every member gives EUR500 in cash to the coordinator, who pays out the monthly pooled sum
of EUR5000–7500 to the participant whose turn it is. At the beginning of a cycle, participants
can say when they prefer to receive their share, which they can receive only once per cycle, and
the group aims to find consensus among all members.
The coordinator selects new members in consultation with the susu participants. A participant
should be trustworthy and must prove that he or she has a sufficient regular income deposited
into a bank account. This implies that most members have decent jobs. So far, Peter has not
encountered any problems. The lump sums received are used mainly for setting up businesses in
Ghana. Some members purchase goods in the Netherlands for resale in Ghana or support family
members or the community back home. For Peter, the most important function of a susu is the
pressure to save regularly.
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Two forms of ROSCA-type susus are used in the Netherlands: one in which people do not
meet personally and one in which members meet monthly. Peter’s susu illustrates a ROSCA
where people do not meet face to face, and the leadership is being carried out in an author-
itarian way. Here the role of the coordinator is crucial, as participants hardly know each other
and the coordinator has to control the financial affairs and manage the functioning of the
ROSCA wisely. As a highly educated Ghanaian migrant earning a fairly high income, Peter
participates in susus purely for financial reasons. His wife convinced him to join a susu to make
use of the social pressure to save. Now, he appreciates the fixed monthly amount of savings,
well aware that he is missing out on the interest he could earn by saving in a formal bank:
If you save alone, you do not have enough pressure because, when you need some money, you
can easily access your savings account. In a susu, you are obliged to save every month because
someone is waiting for it. But you know that you will save about EUR6000. Isn’t that great?
In contrast to Peter, most participants prefer receiving the pot at the beginning of the susu
cycle because either they do not have access to bank loans or they do not want to wait until
they have saved the amount on their own. Those who receive the fund at the beginning of a
susu cycle repay credit with monthly instalments until the end of the cycle. Martha, for
instance, prefers a susu because ‘not everyone can go to the bank and take out a loan’.
Others compare the affordability of a bank loan with the amount of money they receive
from a susu. Paul acknowledges that this kind of loan is much cheaper than a bank loan for
consumption goods. Susus offer the possibility of receiving interest-free loans, whereas at
the bank, he would have to pay more in the end. Although the coordinator does not receive
any financial reward for her efforts, she facilitates reciprocal behaviour among the partic-
ipants, which benefits her reputation.
In the second ROSCA-type susu, which is based on individual trust, low-income partic-
ipants know each other personally. Participants in these susus meet regularly, and the
monthly contribution in the reported susus varies from EUR50 to EUR150. The most
common purpose for the pot is paying the travel costs to Ghana. However, Mary showed
an entrepreneurial attitude regarding the ROSCA money: ‘Maybe some people want to
build a house so that they will have a place to sleep. Others start a business for their
family so that they do not ask every month: “Send me money!”’
The Ghanaians interviewed are mostly positive about the different informal ways of
saving and borrowing in a group, even though there is a distinct difference between
ROSCAs in the Netherlands and Ghana. Some Ghanaians were positive about susus in
Ghana, but not in the Netherlands, because of diminished control mechanisms and low
social trust among some members of the Ghanaian community. The Ghanaian women
interviewed selected susu participants from Dutch neighbourhoods with high concentrations
of Ghanaians, such as the Amsterdam Bijlmer neighbourhood. Being part of such a com-
munity means that they live nearby and meet regularly as neighbours, church members or
friends. This often results in a positively perceived form of earned trust. Martha explains:
If I do not know you, I cannot give you my money. When you see a group of people doing susu,
they know each other, they trust each other. Knowing and trusting each other are two sides of
the same coin.
However, Ghanaians with low incomes report that they cannot afford to participate in
susus. Mary explains: ‘Susu is good. But the social welfare money is too little, so I can’t
do these kinds of things again, but I know people who are doing it .’
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ROSCAs and social resilience reconsidered
To understand how ROSCAs function at the grassroots level as communities of practice, we
looked at two types of ROSCA within the African Diaspora. In the following, we first link
the related concepts of trust, leadership, and hot and cold money to the reported cases
before discussing what role social resilience can play in the contemporary financial land-
scape of the Netherlands.
The case studies show that different forms of trust emerged based on the social ties and
migration backgrounds of Ghanaians and Ethiopians living in the Netherlands. Both groups
arrived in during roughly the same period but for different reasons. The interviewed
Ghanaians are mostly economic migrants who know each other from churches and migrant
associations within their communities, where they have earned a reputation for being trust-
worthy and reliable. In Amsterdam, Ghanaians tend to live in highly concentrated commu-
nities, such as the Bijlmer neighbourhood. Here, individual trust is maintained by local
community relations rather than through participation in financial SHGs. Indeed,
the Ghanaians we interviewed participated in susus for financial motives, and to a lesser
extent to strengthen their existing social relations.
In contrast to the Ghanaians, the interviewed Ethiopians are political refugees, an expe-
rience that seems to have damaged the maintenance of trust relations among community
members, who live scattered throughout the Netherlands. As political refugees with low
social trust within their diaspora community, Ethiopians benefit from reciprocal relations in
iqqubs that help members build earned trust. Consequently, one of the reasons for taking
part in an iqqub is the need for strengthening social relations by increasing heir reputation
of trustworthiness. This is particularly true when taking part in a democratic ROSCA,
where members have to meet in person, handle their financial affairs in mutual understand-
ing and help peers in difficulty. In authoritarian ROSCAs, often elderly women manage
susus and iqqubs and the coordinator’s role becomes even more important when the mem-
bers do not meet in person or do not know each other personally. In such authoritarian
iqqub, trust is earned through financial performance only. The case of the authoritarian
iqqub, however, showed that members may see each other even without regular meetings,
such as socializing at birthday parties, weddings or other social events. Thus in bot cases
participation in a ROSCA can strengthen social relationships in different ways while
defaulting on one’s payments will always change earned trust into distrust, resulting in
being banned from further participation.
The possibilities of saving and of making use of social pressure were the most prominent
financial motives our respondents had for participating in susus or iqqubs. They regarded
their savings as hot money (Wright, 2000) because the money provided within the iqqub or
susu was based on face-to-face contact, even though that contact was different between
democratic and authoritarian ROSCAs. The cheap and relatively easy access to a lump sum
of money was also important to participants. Though both groups used ROSCAs more for
private use, Ghanaians also used their shares to make investments in either Ghana or the
Netherlands. A properly functioning ROSCA depends on the management skills of the
organiser and/or the group control mechanism. Because the financial pool is shared
among the members, it is seen as hot money; but if default behaviour occurs, hot money
can turn into cold money. If that happens, the ROSCA’s continuation is endangered. A
participant might drop out and leave the other members behind with a financial gap. This is
one reason that some respondents choose not to participate in ROSCAs. They recognise the
added value of ROSCAs but prefer the services of formal financial institutions. They prefer
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the cold money option, where they can use banking facilities rather than having to interact
and deal with other group members.
Although this discussion of ROSCAs may seem generally positive, reality shows there is
also a flipside. Especially in authoritarian ROSCAs can result in problems when an orga-
niser cannot collect contributions from all participants. To compensate for the missed pay-
ments, the organiser may confiscate goods from the defaulter’s house (Smets and B€ahre,
2004) or wait for a defaulter at an ATM and grab the withdrawn money (Bijnaar, 2002).
B€ahre (2014) reports that insurance mutuals in South Africa make use of ROSCA-like
organisations, which benefit the better-off and the state, but not the poorer sections of
society. Instead of trickle-down mechanisms that favour the poor, trickle-up economics
show that mutuals channel cash to the state and to companies. Here, money is extracted
from the poor to benefit the better-off.
The cases in our study show that the mechanisms within ROSCAs can adjust to social
situations and can change as needed. For instance, while many Ghanaians prefer to receive
the lump sum at the beginning of the cycle, Ethiopians tend to wait until the end. Members
who still have to build trustworthy reputations are put at the end of the ROSCA cycle to
ensure that they pay their monthly contributions before obtaining their share. And control
mechanisms can be further adapted based on group members’ need to strengthen trust
relations. When a cycle ends, participants can decide whether they will start a new short-
term cycle (12 –18 months) and whether they will adjust the rules and regulations to avoid
institutionalisation based on the local context and ROSCA participation. Non-cooperative
participants can thus be denied membership in the next cycle. These examples show that
iqqubs and susus adapt their mechanisms to new situations but do not transform the basic
ROSCA functioning to something completely new.
The relational elements within ROSCAs are similar to the social resilience discussed in
the theoretical framework section. We, therefore, conclude by linking these insights with our
earlier discussion about resilience in the contemporary financial landscape in the
Netherlands.
Conclusion
Resilience in the contemporary financial landscape is often physically oriented and place
based (regional), as Siemiatycki et al. (2016) show. Emphasis is often put on the efficiency of
financial institutions. Financial crises have even led to more efficiency and the homogeni-
sation of financial and banking institutions. However, a window of viability will not be
reached if the homogenisation of banks goes hand in hand with an increasing number of
similar banking and financial institutions. A way to obtain a more sustainable financial
landscape is to carefully lift invisible, informal financial services, mechanisms and facilities,
which Gibson-Graham (2014) refers to as the iceberg under the water’s surface.
In contrast to the mainstream banking system that has become uniform and characterised
by increasing efficiency and monopolies, ROSCAs rely on different trust relations and
interactions between participants. Hossein (2017) explains that ROSCA members use
their cultural networks and friendships to make financial transactions work. This relational
focus is needed for social resilience. This focus differs from that of solid organizations which
aim for efficient approaches but not necessarily effective. This focus differs from that of
solid organisations – including zombie institutions – which aim for efficient approaches
rather than effective ones. In contrast to the cold money of financial institutions, Hossein
(2017: 39) explains that ROSCAs are a kind of ‘banking that thinks about people as human
beings’. These financial SHGs operate on a small scale and use human control mechanisms
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within mainly authoritarian management systems. It looks like that democratic management
systems are less practiced in both case studies due to the fact that the community does not
reflect the strong ties in the ethnic group as in the country of origin. Weak ties are more
common which asks for in authoritarian managed ROSCAs.
For a sustainable ecosystem, it is important that diversity and resilience play a central
role. Important views on resilience can be found in the engineering and adaptive
approaches. The engineering approach to resilience implies mechanisms of bouncing back
to an original form that neglects historical developments. The adaptive approach implies
that resilient regions can bounce forward, which creates a new situation. Siemiatycki et al.
(2016) show that economic developments are not restricted to a specific region, because
internal and external regional economies interact with each other. However, the engineering
and adaptive approaches tend to neglect power relations and other social issues. Therefore,
the concept of resilience should be expanded towards a broader concept of resilience, one
that offers possibilities for bouncing forward in combination with social resilience. A
broader conceptualization of resilience offers for example possibilities for adjustment of
the operation of a ROSCA in the Netherlands where social control mechanisms are less
strong in comparison to the country the country of origin, as has been described in the
Ghanaian case study. In this study, we applied the concept of social resilience to shine a light
on the role specific financial SHGs play in diversifying the contemporary financial landscape
in the Netherlands. In contrast to financial and banking institutions that deal with cold
money, ROSCAs work with hot money, and they follow a process approach that adjusts
rules and regulations to changing circumstances.
When the grassroots operations of informal financial alternatives are better understood,
they can be used to innovate and diversify financial services. Lietaer et al. (2009) and Lietaer
et al. (2010) assume that if ROSCAs are placed among other financial arrangements – for
example, community currencies, financial cooperatives and crowdfunding – in contempo-
rary financial landscapes, the financial system will seek to rebalance itself. Our study has
been a small attempt to contribute to such a development, with the hope that many other
studies will follow. It shows that the use of physical and social resilience in a financial
landscape leads to more in-depth insights into an ecosystem in which formal and informal
financial arrangements and organisations are included. This study has shown that resilience
in an ecosystem (Lietaer et al. 2009) provides insight in finding an equilibrium in the system,
but more attention has to be paid to the interaction of human beings in a community of
practice. The challenge is to combine resilience at various levels. Next to resilience in an
ecosystem, social resilience for smaller units must be used. In these smaller units – such as a
ROSCA – social relation, trust and management systems can be included. This combination
of different kinds of resilience offers the possibility of zooming in at smaller units within an
ecosystem, such as the Dutch financial landscape.
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